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I explore the prevalence of exchanges of innovation resources inside venture capital portfolios. I show that 
after companies join investors’ portfolios, several proxies of exchanges between them and portfolio 
companies (relative to matched nonportfolio companies) increase by an average of 60%. The increase holds 
when joining events are plausibly exogenous and when VCs’ bargaining power and potential conflicts of 
interest are low. Three novel mechanisms are supported: carve-outs, spawning, and recycling, whereby 
entrepreneurs divest innovation units, start new ventures, and reuse assets in other portfolio companies, 
respectively. Results suggest that returns to innovation are higher in venture capital portfolios. 
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Young companies’ difficulties in profiting from inventions have long been recognized by academics and 
policy makers alike. In almost all cases, the successful commercialization of an innovation requires the 
inventor’s knowhow to be combined with other innovation resources that the original inventor lacks and 
seldom develops herself (Teece, 1994).
1
 The challenge lies in the many frictions that can obstruct exchanges 
of innovation resources among young firms. For example, firms’ investments may be constrained by 
information asymmetries, expropriation risk can prevent inventors from selling their inventions (cf. Arrow, 
1975), and conflicts in arranging complete contracts can preclude trade (cf. Allen and Phillips, 2000). 
In this paper, I explore the prevalence of exchanges of innovation resources between companies sharing 
common venture capitalists (VCs). As strategic investors, VCs have incentives to finance firms with 
complementary innovation resources in an effort to increase investment returns; for example, by internalizing 
innovation spillovers (cf. Teece, 1980; Hellman, 2002) or increasing product prices (cf. Azar, Schmalz, and 
Tecu, 2018). In theory, VCs can also facilitate innovation exchanges; for example, by punishing expropriation 
behavior (e.g., as advisors and board members; see Lerner, 1995 and Hellman and Puri, 2002), bridging 
information asymmetries (e.g., in their role of screeners and monitors; see Sørensen, 2007 and Kaplan and 
Stromberg, 2001, 2002), or financing otherwise constrained firms. In practice, however, competition for 
investors could also obstruct collaboration inside investors’ portfolios (cf. Fulghieri and Sevilir, 2009). 
Ultimately, how prevalent exchanges of innovation resources are inside VC portfolios is an open question. 
The main obstacle in exploring this question is that directly observing exchanges of innovation resources, 
especially among young, private companies (the usual targets of VCs) is not possible: no public markets for 
innovation resources exist. However, I can, and do, look for empirical evidence inside venture capital 
portfolios of measurable cross-company interactions that typically lead to the successful commercialization of 
industrial innovations (as validated by prior work), such as patent citations (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2005; 
Kogan et al., 2017), patent reassignments (Akcigit, Celik, and Greenwood, 2015; Serrano, 2010; Hochberg, 
Serrano, and Ziedonis, 2018), worker mobility (Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Kaiser, Kongsted, and Rønde, 
2015; Azoulay, Graff Zivin, and Sampat, 2012), strategic alliances (Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman, 1996; 
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Stuart, 2000; Gomes-Casseres, Hagedoorn, and Jaffe, 2006), and mergers and acquisitions (cf. Teece, 2010; 
Seru, 2014). I use an event time framework that exploits differences in both the timing when and the investors 
from which companies secure venture capital. I focus on innovative US companies that were financed by US 
VCs, and filed at least one patent in the US Patent and Trademark Office during the 1976-2008 period.  
The results show that after companies join the portfolio of a VC for the first time, several proxies of 
exchanges of innovation resources between them and other companies in the VC’s portfolio (portfolio 
exchanges) increase by an average of 60% (over the sample mean) relative to exchanges between them and 
matched nonportfolio companies (nonportfolio exchanges). The increase holds for both portfolio exchanges 
led by joiners and those led by portfolio firms, and is robust to excluding companies with within-portfolio 
alliances (cf. Lindsey, 2008). The data support three novel mechanisms of within-portfolio exchange: carve-
outs—whereby restructuring companies divest some of their innovation units inside the portfolio, spawning—
whereby entrepreneurs move on to start new companies also financed by the same VCs, and recycling—
whereby the residual assets of restructured companies are absorbed by other portfolio firms.  
My interpretation of these results is that portfolio exchanges can be facilitated and used as a basis for 
investment selection by VCs. Consistent with potential selection effects, there is evidence that some portfolio 
exchanges begin to increase before the joiners enter the portfolio. On the other hand, the relative increase in 
portfolio exchanges is concentrated in some situations where, absent common VCs, such exchanges may not 
arise. For example, the increase is larger for exchanges financed by portfolio companies that are in the same 
industries as joiners, and thus possibly subject to expropriation risk and negative product rivalry effects, 
unless a common VC serves as arbiter.  
Other more mechanical explanations are less consistent with the findings. For example, potential industry, 
scale, technology, and location clustering effects have limited ability to explain the results. Nonportfolio and 
portfolio companies are matched by technological focus, size, industry, and geography, and any fixed 
differences between them are absorbed by the difference-in-differences nature of the methodology. 
Unobserved differences between companies in and out of the venture capital industry cannot explain the 





















venture funds raised as well as company age, location, and technology. A battery of robustness checks shows 
that results are also not driven by influential observations at the state, firm, or company levels or by serial 
correlation and spurious trends. 
The main implication of the results is that exchanges of innovation resources appear prevalent in venture 
capital portfolios. As the successful commercialization of inventions typically requires such exchanges, results 
suggest that returns are higher when innovations are backed by VCs.
2
 This suggestion is consistent with the 
salience of VCs in the finance of high-value innovation: since the 1980s, patents awarded to venture capital-
backed companies amount to circa 6% of US patent grants and command twice as many citations (a standard 
proxy of innovation value) as patents awarded to other types of owners (see Online Appendix 1 and González-
Uribe, 2013). However, whether such potential higher returns trickle down to original inventors is unclear and 
hard to test: VCs face a complex set of incentives, and no comprehensive data exist on return distribution 
between investors and founders. While alternative interpretations cannot be fully ruled out, additional results 
provide some supporting evidence that potential returns trickle down to founders. In particular, I show that 
exchanges continue to increase in situations where VCs’ conflicts of interest and bargaining power over 
founders are plausibly low (such as when the portfolio companies involved in the exchange with the joiner are 
mature firms that the VCs have likely already exited because they entered the portfolio more than five years 
prior). 
The question remains: if companies were randomly assigned across venture capital portfolios, would 
sharing a common VC causally facilitate exchanges of innovation resources?  If so, this would constitute 
evidence of an additional channel through which VCs could add value to their investments (cf. Sørensen, 
2007) and provide some support for the policies worldwide that encourage the development of venture capital 
markets (see Lerner, 2009). Answering this question is, however, challenging given the low feasibility of a 
large scale randomized trial in the venture capital setting. 
                                                             
2
 This suggestion is reminiscent of theories on how intangible assets can be more valuable when they coevolve in a 





















Here, I exploit the staggered adoption of ―prudent man rules‖ (PIR), which allow local pension funds to 
invest in venture capital across states in the US, as plausible exogenous variation in the composition of local 
VCs’ portfolios (cf. González -Uribe, 2013).3 I estimate that a state’s PIR adoption increases the capital 
commitments to the local venture capital industry that are made by local state pension funds by 175 million 
USD (relative to pension funds located elsewhere), possibly because of home bias in state pension funds’ 
venture capital investments (see Hochberg and Rauh, 2013).  
I show that this influx in local venture capital commitments indeed changes the composition of local VCs’ 
portfolios. PIR adoption in a state roughly doubles the mean probability that joiners first enter local VCs’ 
portfolios, conceivably because these investors have more capital to invest, rather than because of 
happenstance shocks to the joiners’ potential for cross-company exchanges. This influx also increases 
(roughly triples) relative portfolio exchanges, even in subsamples of joiners and portfolio companies that are 
located outside VCs’ home states (and further, also outside of ―coincidental states‖ that adopt PIR at the same 
time as the home states of VCs), which mitigates concerns that results are driven by the endogeneity of PIR 
adoption (or the potential impact of PIR adoption on other local investments not related to venture capital). I 
present evidence against other methodological concerns such as aggregate trends in PIR adoption, California 
and/or Massachusetts effects, and biases from mis-measurement in the actual implementation dates of PIR 
adoption across states. Under the assumption that PIR adoption in VCs’ home states does not 
disproportionately increase relative portfolio exchanges through channels other than portfolio joining events, 
these additional results constitute evidence that sharing common VCs causally facilitates exchanges of 
innovation resources.  
This paper contributes to the literature on organizational design and innovation (e.g., Seru, 2014; 
Branstetter and Sakakibara, 2002; Spence, 1984; Bernstein and Nadiri, 1989). As described by Teece (2010), 
the most significant transformation in the organization of corporate innovation during the last five decades has 
been the shift away from centralized laboratories (popular in the 1950s) toward new, more decentralized 
                                                             
3State pension funds are regulated at the state level and were thus not covered by the Employment Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1979 that clarified how pension funds ran at the federal level could invest in venture capital (see Kortum 





















models such as horizontal and vertical alliances across firms. My contribution is to show that VCs appear to 
select their investment portfolios based on the potential for these organizational models. Moreover, the PIR 
adoption results suggest that VCs can also facilitate some of these organizational models among young 
companies, where, absent common owners, frictions such as information asymmetries may prevent them from 
arising on their own.  
This paper also contributes to the literature on the role of venture capital in the real economy (e.g., 
Kortum and Lerner, 2000; Mollica and Zingales, 2007; Hirukawa and Ueda, 2008; Popov and Rosenboom, 
2009; Bernstein et al., 2016). Most related work quantifies the contribution of VCs but remains agnostic about 
how VCs contribute. My results point to one potential mechanism through which venture capital can influence 
innovation: appropriation of innovation returns inside VCs’ portfolios. This mechanism is consistent with 
theories on how investors’ portfolios provide complementary resources to support venture capital-funded 
firms (Hellman, 2002) and are reminiscent of prominent VCs’ claims on how common cross-company 
collaborations are in their portfolios. Relative to the wider literature on private equity, results show that the 
role of this industry in the redeployment of innovative assets to efficient use extends to venture capital and is 
not confined to the long-documented role of buyout funds (cf., Jensen 1989; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009). 
My work is most closely related to Lindsey (2008), who shows that strategic alliances are 
disproportionately likely among companies sharing common VCs. Using a different methodology and sample, 
I show that the potential role of VCs in expanding firm boundaries is much more extensive than previously 
known and how it ranges from informal knowledge exchanges to more formal transfers of human and other 
capital resources. In addition, I offer new evidence on the timing of these exchanges, make a first pass at 
parsing selection from causal effects, and introduce three novel complementary mechanisms of within-





















when the bidder and target share a common VC. There, however, the focus is on merger announcement 
returns and the structure of such transactions.
4
  
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I describe the data. In Section 3, I explain how I 
measure portfolio exchanges. Section 4 describes the empirical strategy and shows that there are significant 
increases in relative portfolio exchanges after joiners first enter VCs’ portfolios. In Section 5, I describe the 
PIR adoption effect on the local venture capital industry and on relative portfolio exchanges. Section 6 
concludes the paper. 
2. Data  
2.1 Capturing data on investments by VCs 
My starting point is the universe of transactions that closed between January 1976 and December 2008 
and are registered in Securities Data Company’s (SDC’s) VentureXpert database. Before 1976, there are only 
a handful of publicly recorded investments by venture capital firms. While information on more recent 
investments is available from the same source, I consider only investments made in or before 2008, as many 
of my outcome variables can only be accurately measured up to that year (see Section 3). In addition, while 
similar information is provided by Venture Source, a unit of Dow Jones, I chose to use the SDC data, as Maats 
et al. (2011) and Kaplan and Lerner (2017) argue that the latter source has better coverage of investments. 
I eliminate three types of investments from the data: transactions by private equity groups other than 
independent VCs (e.g., angel groups), transactions by venture capital firms that are not early stage investments 
(e.g., buyout funds), and investments by VCs in companies that were already traded in public markets before 
the transaction and secondary purchases. Finally, I only include investments made by US VCs in US 
companies. 
For each VC and company pair, I keep track of the name of the fund through which the company first 
joined the VC’s portfolio. In addition, I keep track of every VC’s composition of its investment portfolio (i.e., 
                                                             
4 The paper also relates to Gonzalez-Uribe (2013), which shows that citations of patents increase after companies secure 
venture capital. I focus here only on portfolio citations, which are less than 1% of citations and explain less than 2% of 





















all the companies that the investor has financed through its multiple funds). A company is part of a VC’s 
investment portfolio from the first year it secures investment from such an investor until the end of the sample.  
The data contain 42,670 venture capital portfolio joining events, in which 19,156 joiners enter the 
portfolio of one of 1,876 VCs for the first time between 1976 and 2008. All additional financing rounds 
between a company and an existing venture capital investor are not counted as portfolio joining events in the 
analysis. 
2.2 Capturing data on innovating companies 
I match the companies that secured venture capital to their patent records at the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (USTPO) based on company name. To do so, I use the Harvard Business School (HBS) 
patent database (see Lai, D’Amour and Fleming, 2009) and the data by Kogan et al. (2017). The HBS data 
contain all electronic records of the USPTO for patent filings between 1976 until 2010, which have been 
cleaned and consolidated by HBS, including information on citations made and received by these patents, as 
well as the names and locations of the inventors and of the assignees. I use the data by Kogan et al. (2017) to 
complement information about assignee/inventor location whenever it is missing. 
I restrict my sample to primary assignments of utility patents (99%) filed by U.S. companies through 
December 2008, because I cannot construct citation data for more recent patents given application-to-award 
lags at the USTPO (see Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2001; Seru, 2014; Kogan et al., 2017). After the 
restrictions, the sample consists of 2,881,097 patents awarded to 1,980,696 inventors and issued to 242,767 
U.S. assignees.  
2.3 Combining patent and venture capital information 
To combine the two databases, I strip punctuation, capitalization, and common acronyms from company 
names taken from VentureXpert and assignee names taken from the HBS database. I then combine the 





















matches based on the Levenshtein edit distance.
5
 Using a random sampling procedure, I determine a score 
threshold such that matches with scores above the threshold are hand checked and those below the threshold 
are eliminated. During the manual check of the remaining matches, and whenever possible, I verify that the 
two companies are in the same state. In some ambiguous situations, the names are similar but not identical, or 
the location of the patentee differs from that given in the records of SDC. In these cases, I research the 
potential matches using web searches. In some cases, multiple names in either of the databases appear to 
match a single name in the other data set. For these, I add the observations into an aggregated entity.  
After the name match, I manually go over observations that present inconsistencies in the information 
retrieved from the SDC and patent data sets. For example, I exclude all patents that, according to the patent 
data, were filed before the companies were founded (as recorded by the SDC).
6
 
Patents filed by Sun Microsystems make up 9.0% of the patents filed by venture capital-backed 
companies. In robustness checks, I show that the results are the same if I exclude Sun Microsystems from the 
analysis (see Section 3.2). 
 
After these exclusions, the patent awards of no single company make up more than 
5% of the data.
7
 Similarly, patents filed by companies funded by the venture capital firm Kleiner Perkins 
Caufield & Byers constitute 15% of the data. In robustness checks, I show that the results are the same if I also 
exclude these companies from the analysis (see Section 3.2). Financing events by no venture capital firm or to 
no company constitute more than 5% of the sample [New Enterprise Associates Inc. and Applied Micros 
Circuits Corporation are, respectively, the venture capital firm and company with the next largest number of 
financing events, 247 (2%) and 14 (0.12%)]. 
2.4 Analysis sample 
                                                             
5 The Levenshtein edit distance is a measure of the degree of proximity between two strings and corresponds to the number of 
substitutions, deletions, or insertions needed to transform one string into the other one (and vice versa). 
6
 Further, I also exclude companies founded before 1976 and companies that filed innovations or were founded more than 
ten years before they secured their first VC investment. For example, I exclude all patents assigned to SmithKline 
Beckman Corporation, which was founded in 1830. Although investments in this company pass all the restriction filters 
imposed before the match, this company does not correspond to the typical VC investment. Not only had the company 
been established for more than 100 years before securing VC, but the investment was by Faneuil Hall Associates, a family 
investment firm that was classified by SDC as a venture capital firm. 
7 Other important companies in the sample in terms of the number of patents include 3Com Corporation (1.3%), Altera 
Corporation (1.5%), Applied Materials Inc. (4.1%), Compaq Computer Corporation (1.8%), Cypress Semiconductor 





















The final sample includes information for 3,960 joiners that filed 74,771 patents (approximately 2.5% of 
all patent awards) and first entered the portfolio of one of 1,265 VCs during 1976-2008. The data include 
11,815 portfolio joining events (approximately 28% of joining events in the SDC data). The small size of the 
matched sample relative to the universe of patenting assignees is consistent with the relatively small size of 
the venture capital industry. The modest sample size, relative to the universe of joining events, is consistent 
with the prevalence of venture capital investments in industries where intellectual property is not necessarily 
protected using patents (e.g., internet, media, and software companies) and with the large attrition of 
companies in the SDC files (i.e., one-third of the companies that secure VC financing are liquidated, many of 
them before the company files a patent).  
 I structure the data in ―portfolio joining event time‖ for every joiner and VC pair in the sample. I collect 
information on exchanges across the joiner and the portfolio companies of the VC five years before and six 
years after the joining event. For some of the joining events early (late) in the sample I can only collect 
information for a window of less than five years before (six years after) the investment. In robustness checks, I 
show that the results are quantitatively similar if I restrict the data to joining events for which information for 
the full 11-year window is available (see Section 4.2).  
Table 1 presents the composition of the sample and summary statistics. The first five columns in Panel A 
show the distribution of portfolio joining events over time by type of investment: total, seed, early stage, 
expansion, and later stage. The last two columns in Panel A show the distribution over time of patent 
applications and grants.  
Panel A in Table 1 shows that the distribution of patent applications and portfolio joining events mimics 
the increase and decline of the venture capital industry throughout the boom and bust of the dot-com crisis, 
particularly early stage joining events. The distribution of grants reflects the lags in patent awards by the 
USPTO.  
Panel B in Table 1 shows the distribution of the sample across companies’ and VCs’ home states. Not 
surprisingly, the sample is concentrated in California (56% of patents, 47% of companies, and 33% of VCs), 





















potential California effects (see Sections 4.2 and 5.4). Panel C shows the distribution of patents in the sample 
across two-digit technology classes. The most popular technology classes include Computer Hardware and 
Software (17%), Communications (11%), Semiconductor Devices (10%), and Medical Instruments (9%). The 
importance of these technology classes in the sample reflects the industry distribution of VC investments 
described in Panel D, which is concentrated in medical health (18%), semiconductors (17%), computer 
software (16%), and communications (11%). 
3. Measuring cross-company exchanges of innovation resources  
Because exchanges of innovation resources between companies are not observable, I construct several 
proxies based on company interactions related to the distribution and promotion of innovations. Several such 
proxies have been associated by prior work to the successful commercialization of inventions, such as patent 
citations, patent reassignments, worker exchanges, strategic alliances, and mergers and acquisitions. 
Patent citations are the standard metric in the innovation literature to measure knowledge exchanges 
(Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson, 1993; Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2005; Kogan et al., 2017). These 
citations serve the important legal function of limiting the innovation protected by the patent document.
8
 
While patent citations are useful in that they allow for a paper trail between innovations, the downside is that 
parties other than the inventors may add citations, and hence some citations may not necessarily reflect actual 
knowledge flows between the cited and citing parties (Thompson and Fox-Kean, 2005; Roach and Cohen, 
2010). For example, it is possible that VCs encourage citations across companies in their investment portfolio 
for legal reasons, such as building patent thickets that may restrict the access of other unrelated parties to their 
knowledge. These strategic citations may also be consistent with cross-company exchanges that can increase 
profits from inventions. The difference is that they would not correspond to knowledge flows but rather to 
exchanges of intellectual property protection. Using information from the HBS patent data set and from Kogan 
et al. (2017), I construct three proxies of exchanges of innovation resources based on patent citation data: 
Citations received, Citations made, and Overall citations. These proxies measure over time, respectively, 
                                                             
8 Arguably, this legal function creates strong incentives for inventors to get these citations right. As Jaffe, Trajtenberg, 
and Henderson (1993) put it, including extraneous citations is ―leaving money on the table.‖ Likewise, deliberately 






















citations from the portfolio companies to the patents of the new joiner, citations from the joiner to the patents 
of other portfolio companies, and the combination of both of these types of citations. Given the lag between 
application grants and applications, I only consider patents filed by 2008, so as to have at least two years of 
citation data (the last year of filings in the patent data is 2010; see Section 2.2). 
Patent reassignments are transfers of intellectual property between patent assignees and third parties. They 
have been used in several papers as measures of ownership transfer of innovations between companies 
(Akcigit, Celik, and Greenwood, 2016; Galasso, Schankermann, and Serrano, 2013; Hochberg, Serrano, and 
Ziedonis, 2018; Serrano, 2010). I focus here on reassignments to other innovative companies given the 
investment profile of venture capital firms. I note however, that other important patent reassignments include 
collateral pledges to financial institutions (see Mann, 2018). Based on data from the USTPO Bulk Downloads 
at Google, I construct three proxies of exchanges of innovation resources using patent reassignments: Patents 
sold, Patents bought, and Patent sales.
9
 The first (second) proxy measures over time the patents bought by 
(sold to) joiners from (by) other portfolio companies. The third proxy combines the first two measures of 
patent reassignments.  
Cross-company worker mobility mediates exchanges of innovation resources, such as knowledge flows, 
between firms (Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Agrawal, Cockburn, and McHale, 2006; Azoulay, Zivin, and 
Sampat, 2012; Kaiser, Kongsted, and Rønde, 2015; Fallick, Fleischmann, and Rebitzer, 2006). This type of 
exchange can be especially relevant in the venture capital context, as VCs are also known to help companies 
hire (cf. Hellman and Puri, 2002). Worker mobility between two companies is inferred here mostly from the 
inventor files of the patent data because comprehensive information on the workers of venture capital-backed 
companies is not publicly available.
10
 I define an inventor as moving from company A to company B at time t, 
if at time t the inventor assigns a patent to company B, and at any year prior to t the inventor assigned a patent 
to company A. I construct three proxies of exchanges of innovation resources using the HBS inventor data: 
Inventor emigrates, Inventor immigrants, and Inventor exchanges. The first (second) proxy measures over 
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 See: https://www.google.com/googlebooks/uspto-patents-assignments.html  
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time the number of inventors that moved from the joiner (any portfolio company) to any of the portfolio 
companies (the new joiner). The third proxy combines the first two measures. I note that these proxies are not 
meant to capture, and do not necessarily capture, violations of noncompete agreements, which are common in 
employment contracts (Marx, 2013; see also discussions in Sections 5.3 and 5.4). Rather, these measures are 
more likely to measure the legal turnover of inventors across firms.  
I also consider several types of business integration between joiners and portfolio companies, including 
alliances as well as mergers and acquisitions. Alliances have been used as measures of exchanges of 
innovation resources between firms (Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman, 1996; Stuart, 2000; Gomes-Casseres, 
Hagedoorn, and Jaffe, 2006), particularly venture capital-backed firms (Lindsey, 2008), while mergers and 
acquisitions are a standard measure of firm integration in the finance literature (Seru, 2014). I construct two 
final proxies of exchanges of innovation resources based on these additional data: alliances and mergers and 
acquisitions. Each proxy equals one after the joiner and at least one of the portfolio companies enter an 
alliance or merge (get acquired or are acquired), respectively. I manually match the companies that secured 
venture capital to their alliances and merger and acquisition activity based on company name. To do so, I 
employ information from SDC Platinum at Thomson-Reuters.
11
 
 Table 2 shows summary statistics of the different proxies of exchanges of innovation resources between 
joiners and portfolio companies in the sample. I refer to these exchanges as portfolio exchanges throughout. 
3.1 Patterns in portfolio exchanges between joiners and other portfolio companies 
Fig. 1 plots the average portfolio exchanges between joiners and portfolio companies for the different 
proxies against joining event time. The solid (dotted) line plots the estimated coefficients (95
th
 confidence 
intervals) of the     in the following equation: 
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 The data on alliances include 128,770 alliances between US-based companies for the 1972-2016 period. There are a 
total of 17,366 alliances between innovating companies and 5,485 (761) in which at least one (both) of the innovating 
companies is VC-backed. The data on mergers and acquisitions include 324,762 mergers and acquisitions between US-
based companies for the 1972-2016 period. There are a total of 95,341 mergers and acquisitions between innovating 





















         ∑                                   
where      is any measure of portfolio exchanges between joiner i and portfolio companies of VC j at time t, 
and the             are event-time dummies that light up k years before/after the joiner first joins the VC’s 
portfolio. Fixed effects for every pair of joiner and VC,    , absorb any time-invariant complementarities 
between joiners and other portfolio companies. Calendar year fixed effects,   , control for aggregate trends in 
the different measures of portfolio exchange.  
The series of coefficients    are the main estimates of interest. For    ,    is an estimate of the change 
in portfolio exchanges k years after the joining event between portfolio companies and joiners, relative to all 
other portfolio exchanges for joiners in the sample that did not enter the portfolio of a VC k periods ago but 
did so before or will do so after. Similarly, for    ,    is an estimate of the change in portfolio exchanges   
years before the financing event. The    coefficients are normalized relative to the year before the joining 
event (    ), which is set to zero. Standard errors are clustered at the joiner and VC pair level to adjust for 
heteroskedasticity and within-pair correlation over time.  
Fig. 1 shows that after joiners enter VCs’ portfolios for the first time, portfolio exchanges between them 
and other companies in the portfolio increase. For example, Panel A shows an increase in Citations received 
after the joiner enters the portfolio, while no trend exists prior to the joining event. The rest of the panels in the 
figure plot portfolio exchanges between joiners and portfolio companies against joining event time for the 
different proxies and show a similar increasing pattern. 
The patterns in portfolio exchanges exhibited in Fig. 1 are consistent with the prevalence of exchanges of 
innovation resources inside venture capital portfolios. Other potential explanations naturally exist. For 
example, the patterns can also reflect trends in the size of venture capital portfolios and joiners. Given that 
VCs often specialize their investments, the patterns may also reflect potential industry, scale, technology, and 





















 To control for potential aggregate trends and clustering effects, I adjust all metrics of portfolio exchanges 
using data on the different proxies of exchanges of innovation resources between joiners and matched 
portfolio companies. For every company in the portfolio of a VC, I select an observationally equivalent match 
from the universe of patenting companies in the US that did not secure venture capital over the sample period. 
In particular, portfolio companies and their respective matches are located in the same state and have the same 
patent-production scale (i.e., number of patents), technological base (i.e., distribution across two-digit 
technology classes of citations made to prior innovations), and technological focus (i.e., the three-digit 
technology class mode of patents).
12
 Because venture capital-funded companies are likely to have different 
growth paths than non-venture-backed companies, the matches are recalibrated every year.
13
 Online Appendix 
2 has a detailed explanation of the matching procedure and discusses matching statistics. Using these matched 
portfolio companies, I then estimate relative portfolio exchange measures for all the outcome variables 
included in the analysis. For each original measure of portfolio exchanges, the relative version subtracts (from 
the original) the respective exchanges between joiners and matched nonportfolio companies. To distinguish 
between the different types of exchange measures, I identify the matched measures with the prefix ―matched,‖ 
and the relative measures with the prefix ―relative.‖ Table 2 reports summary statistics for the relative and 
matched outcome variables.  
Fig. 2 shows that potential aggregate trends or clustering effects cannot explain the increase in portfolio 
exchanges after the portfolio joining event. Following the same structure as Fig. 1, Fig. 2 plots relative 
portfolio exchanges between joiners and portfolio companies against joining event time for the different 
proxies. The increasing pattern post-joining is still evident for the relative measures. For most of the relative 
exchange metrics, there is a clear mean shift after joiners enter the portfolio (see Panels A-I). For Relative 
alliances and Relative mergers and acquisitions, there is a sharp trend break after joiners enter the portfolio 
(see Panels J and K, respectively). The patterns suggest that more contractually difficult arrangements across 
                                                             
12 In Online Appendix 4, I show that results are quantitatively similar when I use alternative matching methodologies 
based on the amount of venture funds raised, company, age, location, and technology (see also Section 4.2). 
13
 In unreported results, I check whether the results are the qualitatively the same if I rely instead on a single match across 
the sample for each portfolio company. I present the results using the annual matches because the matching statistics are 





















joiners and portfolio companies (such as integration) are only established with time, after the joiners settle in 
the portfolio. 
Fig. 2 also shows that the increase in relative portfolio exchanges holds for both exchanges financed by 
joiners and those financed by the other companies in the VC’s portfolio. After joiners first enter a VC’s 
portfolio, portfolio companies are relatively more likely to cite (Panel A) and purchase (Panel D) joiners’ 
patents as well as hire joiners’ inventors (Panel G). These results suggest that financing effects where the 
increase in relative portfolio exchanges is due to the cash infusions of joiners can only partially explain the 
results, as portfolio companies do not generally secure financing at the same time as the new joiner. Other 
potential explanations include the mitigation of contracting complexities, which are also prevalent among 
young companies, inside VC portfolios. 
Fig. 2 also shows evidence of anticipation effects (that is, evidence of increasing relative portfolio 
exchanges before the joiner first enters the portfolio), such as Relative citations made (Panel B) and Relative 
inventor immigrants (Panel H). These patterns suggest that portfolio exchanges can be used as a basis for 
selecting investment portfolios by VCs.
14
 For some of the metrics, the trend plateaus or reverts after a couple 
of years.
15
 The timing of this plateau is likely explained by the exit of the VC from the company (cf. Lindsey, 
2008).  
4. Empirical strategy 
I summarize the results of the portfolio joining event study analysis of Section 3.1 in Table 3. I report 
results from a more parsimonious model than Eq. (1):                                                    
where         is a variable that equals one after joiner i enters the portfolio of VC j for the first time. The term           is the interaction between         and the number of years since the time of the joining event (  . 
                                                             
14 Unreported results suggest that VCs also use information on portfolio exchanges to select possible syndication 
partners. I find that the prefunding patterns in Figs. 1 and 2 are more pronounced for the later rounds when the 
investment syndicate increases than for the earlier rounds. This additional result is broadly consistent with the work of 
Hochberg, Lindsey, and Westerfield (2015) on the importance of resource accumulation in the formation of venture 
capital co-investment networks. 
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This interaction term will be equal to zero in the years before the joiner enters the portfolio and start at one in 
the year after the joining event.  
The specification in Eq. (2) allows for both a mean shift (   and a trend break ( ) after the joining event, 
which captures the dynamics of joining venture capital portfolios more flexibly. The coefficient of interest,      , measures the change in the mean (slope) outcome of interest before and after the portfolio joining 
event. These changes are relative to all other joiners that do not join a new portfolio in that year (but have 
either already entered a new portfolio or will join a new portfolio in the future). 
 I do not control for any time-varying variables at the level of the new joiner, portfolio, or pair, as most of 
these are outcomes of the joining event. Therefore, I cannot separate the effect of entering the portfolio from 
the effect of other changes that occur at the same time as the joining event but are not related to the event. In 
all regressions, standard errors are clustered at the joiner and VC pair level to adjust for heteroskedasticity and 
within-pair correlation over time. The results are quantitatively similar with other levels of clustering (see 
Section 4.2).  
4.1 Main results 
Table 3 confirms the patterns in Figs. 1 and 2. After a joiner first enters the portfolio of a VC, there is a 
positive and significant mean shift in portfolio exchanges (Panel A) as well as in relative portfolio exchanges 
(Panels B) between the joiner and other companies in the VC’s portfolio. On average, the different types of 
portfolio exchanges increase by 60% (over the sample mean) relative to nonportfolio exchanges.
16
 The largest 
mean shift is for Relative inventor exchanges, which increase by 0.012 (Column 9, Panel B), corresponding to 
a 120% increase over the sample mean (0.01; see Table 2). The smallest significant mean shift is for Relative 
patents sold (Column 4, Panel B), which increase by 0.004, representing a 40% growth over the unconditional 
mean (0.01; Table 2). Online Appendix 3 shows that the increase in relative portfolio exchanges is similar on 
both the coasts, where VC funding is common, as well as in the rest of the US. 
                                                             
16 For example, the estimated number of additional portfolio citations received by new joiners within five years of the 





















The last two columns in Panel B of Table 3 show a trend break of 0.001 in both Relative alliances, and 
Relative mergers and acquisitions, even though there is no mean shift. This trend break is economically 
significant; it respectively corresponds to a 100% and 50% increase per post-event year over the sample mean 
(0.001 and 0.002; Table 2). Evidence in support of a trend break but not in support of a mean shift in Relative 
alliances simultaneously confirms Lindsey’s (2008) ―alliance mechanism‖ (using a different methodology and 
sample) and suggests that this mechanism of resource exchange is not the only one at work within venture 
capital portfolios (as there is evidence of a mean shift for all other measures except mergers and acquisitions). 
The results in Online Appendix 3 confirm this suggestion by showing that the increase in portfolio exchanges 
holds after I exclude all joiners with within-portfolio alliances from the analysis. I return to a discussion of 
potential mechanisms in Section 4.4. 
4.2 Robustness checks 
Results from several robustness checks are summarized in the Online Appendix. Online Appendix 3 
shows the findings are not driven by state, firm, or company-level influential observations; most results (20 
out of 22) hold after I exclude observations from the states of California and/or Massachusetts and from the 
firms Kleiner Perkins and Sun Microsystems. The results are also robust to excluding all joiner and VC pairs 
for which I cannot construct the full financing event 11-year window (see Section 2.4). 
Online Appendix 3 also shows that differential trends across industries or states do not drive the results, 
which continue to hold after I include fixed effects at the level of industry by year, joiner state by year, and 
VC state by year. They also hold for different levels of clustering at the VC level, joiner level, or at both the 
VC and joiner levels. Concerns of serially correlated outcomes are also mitigated in the Online Appendix, 
where I show that results are quantitatively similar after I collapse the time series variation to a two-period 
pair panel (and include fixed effects for every joiner and VC pair in the estimation). Because joining events 
occur at different years across joiner and VC pairs, I collapse the data by using pairwise residuals from 
regressing      (i.e., the proxy of exchanges of innovation resources) on year dummies and aggregating those 
from years before and after the joining event into the pre- and post- periods for every joiner and VC pair in the 





















In Online Appendix 3, I also show that the results are not driven by a mechanical increase in VC portfolio 
size over time nor by spurious time trends. I summarize results from 1,000 placebo tests where I randomly 
pick the years of joining events for the pairs in the sample. Nonrejection rates are close to (and often below) 
5% for all measures of portfolio exchanges, as would be expected from randomly choosing the joining events. 
Finally, Online Appendix 4 shows that the results are not driven by differences between companies in and 
out of the venture capital industry. The findings are quantitatively similar under alternative matching 
methodologies based on the amounts of venture capital raised as well as on company age, location, and 
technology. 
4.3 Heterogeneity  
Tables 4 and 5 report the regression results from several cuts of the sample. Consistent with VCs 
potentially facilitating portfolio exchanges, Panels A and B in Table 4 show that the relative increase in 
portfolio exchanges appears strongest (for most proxies) for joiners and pairs where the expropriation risks 
and information asymmetries are largest. Most notably, the increase is stronger for joining companies that are 
more likely to have uncertain products and technologies, such as younger firms (Panel A) or those in an early 
stage of development (Panel B). Younger firms are those that are below the median company age of two years 
at the time of financing. Company age is measured relative to founding age. Early stage firms are those whose 
first investment by a VC was secured either at seed or early stage according to the SDC files.  
Also consistent with VCs facilitating exchanges of innovation resources, Panel A in Table 5 shows that 
the increase in portfolio exchanges holds in situations where cross-company exchanges are likely fraught with 
contracting complexities. Most notably, and consistent with Lindsey (2008), the increase holds between 
industry competitors (i.e., joiners and portfolio companies that have the same SDC industry classification).
17
  
Panel D in Table 4 shows that the increase in relative portfolio exchanges is, on average, stronger and 
materializes faster (i.e., there is a significant mean shift after joiners enter the portfolio) for more experienced 
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 In unreported exercises, I show that the results are similar across new joiners of ―generalist‖ and ―specialist‖ VCs. I 
code a VC with a minimum of five investments as specialist (generalist) if 90% of its investments over the previous five 





















VCs, as measured by the number of prior investments made by the VC, following Lindsey (2008). For 
younger VCs, the effect is instead more gradual; columns 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, and 11 show a positive and 
significant trend break (but no evidence of a mean shift) after joining young VCs’ portfolios. In unreported 
regressions, I confirm that the differences across senior and junior VCs are not driven by differences in 
portfolio size across investors of different ages. These differences also hold for ―first rounds‖ where 
companies secure venture capital (from any investor) for the first time and appear stronger for later (i.e., not 
the first) investment rounds. A VC is defined as young if its age is below the median investor age of six years 
at the time of the investment, as measured relative to the first time in the SDC data that the VC makes an 
investment.  
Further, consistent with how competition for VCs’ resources may also prevent cross-company exchanges, 
Panel B in Table 5 shows the increase in relative exchanges is often most pronounced between joiners and 
other companies in the portfolio of the VC that are not in direct competition for the VC’s resources because 
they were financed by a different fund. For joiners and portfolio companies financed by the same fund of the 
VC, only relative portfolio exchanges related to patent reassignments (columns 4-6, Panel B) are more likely 
to increase after the portfolio joining event.  
The main implication of results is that exchanges of innovation resources appear prevalent in venture 
capital portfolios. Since the successful commercialization of inventions typically requires firms to combine 
their inventions with other complementary resources that they do not own or develop, my preferred 
interpretation of the results is that returns to innovation are higher when inventions are developed inside 
venture capital portfolios. This interpretation is supported by prior literature showing positive links between 
cross-company exchanges and value, such as studies showing how resource exchanges across firms are met, 
on average, with positive reactions in the public equity markets (e.g., Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2005, for 
patent citations; Denis and Denis, 1995, for CEO turnover; Chan et al., 1997, for alliances; and Kaplan, 2006 
for mergers and acquisitions). However, I cannot fully rule out that in the venture capital context, higher 
innovation rents do not trickle down to inventors: VCs are subject to a complex set of incentives (e.g., 
Hellman, 2002) and typically hold large bargaining power over founders. Empirically, the related evidence is 





















hard to measure for the private firms that are the usual targets of VCs. Although alternative interpretations 
cannot be fully ruled out, additional results provide supporting evidence that potential returns trickle down to 
founders. In particular, this interpretation is supported by results showing that portfolio exchanges also 
increase in situations where VCs’ conflicts of interest are potentially low, and where VCs have little 
bargaining power over the portfolio companies involved in the exchange with the joiner, such as in mature 
firms that entered the portfolio more than five years prior and that VCs are likely to have already exited (see 
Online Appendix 3).  
4.4 Mechanisms 
Tables 6 and 7 summarize the results from a battery of tests, which, taken at face value, support three 
novel mechanisms of exchanges of innovation resources inside venture capital portfolios.  
The first mechanism is spawning, by which I mean instances where entrepreneurs move on to start new 
companies also financed by the same VCs. In support of this mechanism, Panel A in Table 6 starts by showing 
that inventors that emigrate from the joiner towards the VC’s portfolio appear to go mostly toward future 
rather than to incumbent portfolio companies (compare columns 4 and 7 in Panel A). This temporal 
emigration pattern of inventors is as expected with spawning; the idea is that entrepreneurs leave to start new 
companies that have not been founded at the time of the joining event. I classify firms into incumbent and 
future portfolio companies according to whether they already exist in the portfolio during the new joiner’s 
joining event. Inventor exchanges are then categorized (and denoted by a corresponding suffix) into future or 
incumbent according to the type of portfolio company they move to or from.  
Because many founders do not file patents, but most should hold executive positions in the firm, I provide 
additional and arguably more direct evidence of the spawning mechanism by investigating the emigration 
patterns of the company executives reported in SDC.
18
 Panel B in Table 6 shows two striking results in 
support of the spawning mechanism. First, executive exchanges, as measured by the movement of executives 
                                                             
18 I retrieve data on executives from SDC and define an executive as moving from company A to company B at time t, if 
at time t the individual appears as an executive of company B, and at any year prior to t the individual appeared as an 
executive of company A. The variable Executive emigrates (Executive immigrants) measures the number of executives 
that moved from the joiner (any portfolio company) to any of the portfolio companies (the new joiner) over time. 





















across companies, are also prevalent inside VC portfolios: there is a 153% increase in executive exchanges (to 
and from joiners and the VC’s portfolio) after joiners enter the portfolio (0.020 relative to the unconditional 
mean of 0.013; see column 3 in Panel B). Second, company executives have the same temporal pattern of 
emigration as inventors: most executives tend to leave for future, rather than incumbent, portfolio companies 
(compare columns 4 and 7 in Panel B).
19
   
The second mechanism of exchanges of innovation resources inside venture capital portfolios that finds 
support in the data is carve-outs, i.e., instances where entrepreneurs divest some of their innovation units 
inside the portfolio. The increase in Relative mergers and acquisitions shown in Table 3 (column 11, Panel B) 
provides the first piece of evidence consistent with this mechanism. Because carve-outs are likely to involve 
the simultaneous exit of several workers (say, all inventors in one same business unit), rather than the isolated 
transfer of individual workers, I move on to explore the prevalence of, and circumstances surrounding, 
grouped departures. The results in Table 7 provide further support for carve-outs: Panel A shows that the bulk 
of inventor emigrations constitute grouped departures (compare columns 3 and 5); that is, instances in which 
more than one inventor (i.e., a team of inventors) emigrates. More importantly, Panel B shows that 7% (3%) 
of such grouped departures occur within four years of a within-portfolio merger or acquisition of the joiner by 
an incumbent (future) portfolio company. Group departures are hand classified into seven categories of 
corporate events by comparing the timing of the emigration and the timing of such corporate events.
20
 Finally, 
I make further use of the executives’ data to provide additional evidence in support of carve-outs. The results 
in Panel C of Table 6 show that almost 10% of inventor exchanges coincide with the executives of the joiner 
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 The analysis of executives has some limitations. First, I only capture executive changes if companies raise rounds of 
financing. If they do not, they will not appear in the SDC sample. Thus, as with measures of inventor exchanges, my 
executive metrics likely underestimate executive exchanges. Second, I cannot construct measures of relative executive 
exchanges (which control for technological clustering in portfolios) because there is no information on the executives of 
nonportfolio companies. 
20 The seven categories of corporate events are: merger or acquisition by a company outside the VC portfolio, merger or 
acquisition by an incumbent portfolio company, merger or acquisition by a future portfolio company, IPO, liquidation, 
restructuring, and founding. The class reorganization includes several types of corporate events including: the hiring of 
new CEOs, securing investment from government, and opening a foreign subsidiary. An inventor emigration is classified 
as a respective corporate event if it occurs within four years of the event. An emigration event is unclassifiable if it does 





















also leaving the firm (column 6).
21
 This coincidence is consistent with carve-outs, as I expect both scientists 
and managers to exit firms in tandem when companies divest some of their innovation units.  
The final mechanism of exchange of innovation resources inside venture capital portfolios supported by 
the data is recycling, whereby the assets of restructuring portfolio companies are absorbed by other portfolio 
firms. Panel B in Table 7 shows that 31% of grouped departures from joiners toward portfolio companies can 
be traced to a restructuring event of the new joiner, such as a merger or acquisition (with a company outside of 
the portfolio of the VC, 22%), an initial public offering (2%), or a more informal reorganization (such as the 
hiring of new CEOs, 7%). Results in the panel also show that 3% of grouped departures absorbed in the 
portfolio follow a liquidation event of the new joiner.  
Overall, the preponderance of evidence in Tables 6 and 7 supports the mechanisms of spawning, carve-
outs, and recycling, although I cannot directly test any of these channels due to data limitations (e.g., there are 
no public records on divesting discussions by VCs and entrepreneurs). These mechanisms are also broadly 
consistent with prior work and with anecdotal evidence, but this analysis is, to my knowledge, their first 
collective quantitative evidence. For example, spawning echoes the serial entrepreneur phenomenon studied 
elsewhere (e.g., Gompers et al., 2010). The novelty here lies in showing that the recurring pattern is also found 
in the relations between entrepreneurs and the same investors rather than just in the unilateral founding 
decisions of entrepreneurs. While other work examines the repeated relationships between VCs and serial 
founders (e.g., Bengtsson, 2013), evidence on how these repeated relations also extend to inventors is new. 
Similarly, carve-outs are consistent with the notion that VCs help companies recruit key personnel (e.g., 
Hellman and Puri, 2002; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2001), and support the bridge-building role of VCs in 
mergers and acquisitions as shown by Gompers and Xuan (2012). The focus on bulk hiring of inventors is new 
here, and is reminiscent of the ―acqui-hiring‖ phenomenon described by the popular press. Finally, recycling is 
consistent with the well-documented fact that VCs play a major role in exits, such as structuring mergers, 
acquisitions, initial public offerings, and liquidations (e.g., Sahlman, 1990). The evidence on the reuse of 
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 For this complementary test, I combine information on inventors and executives and construct measures of conditional 





















human capital assets inside the portfolio is novel and points to one specific role for VCs: strategic 
management of residual assets in restructurings.  
5.  Exploiting the adoption of PIR across states as an exogenous determinant of VCs’ portfolios 
The question remains: if companies were randomly assigned across VCs’ portfolios, would sharing a 
common VC facilitate exchanges of innovation resources? Because a large scale randomized trial is unfeasible 
in this setting, in this section, I exploit regulatory changes to the investment policy of state pension funds 
(namely, the adoption of PIR) as plausible exogenous variation in the composition of VCs’ portfolios. I begin 
by providing a background of the PIR. Then, I show that PIR adoption in a VC’s home state predicts the 
timing of when joiners enter VCs’ portfolios for the first time as well as the prevalence of portfolio exchanges 
between joiners and other portfolio companies. I conclude by presenting several robustness checks and 
discussing the interpretation of the results. 
5.1 Institutional setting: adoption of prudent investor rules across states 
State pension funds are among the most important limited partners in the venture capital industry. In 2011, 
they accounted for 28% of new funds committed to venture capital, almost twice the 13% accounted for by the 
industry’s second most important capital provider, fund of fund managers.22 Prior work shows that these funds 
have a substantial home state bias in their private equity investments (see Hochberg and Rauh, 2013). The 
likely cause of this home state bias is local development policies, in the form of economically targeted 
investments, to which state pension funds are typically subject. For example, state pension funds are often 
required to invest in companies and industries located within the state’s borders as a way of promoting local 
employment (Brown, Pollet, and Weisbener, 2012).
23
 
State pension funds are governed at the local level. Their significant participation as limited partners of 
venture capital firms can be traced back to state-level regulatory changes on such funds’ admissible 
                                                             
22 Source: author’s calculations using Preqin data for 2011. 
23 Brown, Pollet, and Weisbener (2012) report, ―Overall, we find that the state-managed equity portfolios hold a broadly 
diversified portfolio of stocks. Relative to the value weighted index of all US equities, these state managed plans 
overweight large (i.e., S&P 500) stocks. […] However, we also find strong evidence that these plans overweight the 





















investments. In particular, this participation can be linked to the adoption of prudent investor rules (PIR) that 
allowed state pension funds, which were not covered in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA) clarification of 1979, to invest in venture capital. State-level PIR adoption was prompted by the 1994 
Uniform Prudent Investor Act (UPIA) of the Uniform Law Commission. Similarly to ERISA, UPIA requires 
trustees to become devotees of ―modern portfolio theory‖ and to invest as a prudent investor would invest by 
―considering the purposes, terms, distribution requirements, and other circumstances of the trust‖ while using 
―reasonable care, skill, and caution.‖ 
 State-level adoption of PIR through UPIA began during the early 1990s, when state pension funds 
accounted for only 4% of funds committed to VC.
24
 Today, the majority of US states (46) have adopted PIR 
by enacting UPIA. Adoption was staggered across states, as shown in Fig. 3. Information about UPIA 
adoption is from Uniform Laws Annotated, published by Thompson-Reuters and summarized in Online 
Appendix 5.  I consider two different proxies for the date of PIR adoption in each state: PIR enactment (i.e., 
the date the UPIA legislation was signed into law in the state) and PIR implementation (i.e., the effective date 
of the UPIA enactment). Online Appendix 5 shows PIR implementation lags behind PIR enactment in 15 out 
46 states. The average lag is 0.37 years among the 46 states and 1.13 years among the states where there is a 
lag. Among the early adopters were Illinois, New York, and California, which adopted PIR via UPIA 
enactment in 1992, 1994, and 1995, respectively. The latest adopter of PIR via UPIA enactment was Montana 
in 2013.  
Similar to how ERISA increased funding for the US venture capital industry, state-level PIR adoption 
increased local venture capital firms’ funding sources. Following states’ PIR adoption via UPIA enactment 
(implementation), capital commitments to local venture capital firms by state pension funds increased by an 
average of 175 (187) million USD relative to pension funds located in other states. The increase was 
economically significant: it corresponded to a 54% (29%) relative increase over average nominal (real) capital 
commitments prior to PIR adoption via UPIA enactment. This increase was not exclusively driven by 
California and reflected a general shift in the investment policy of state pension funds toward local private 
                                                             
24





















equity (including buyout funds). To produce these estimates, I compare changes in capital commitments to 
local venture capital firms by local state pension funds (which were affected by the PIR adoption) relative to 
those from pension funds located elsewhere (which were not affected by the PIR adoption) after a state’s PIR 
adoption, using a triple difference–in–differences methodology. In Online Appendix 6, I explain in detail the 
data sources and methodology used to produce these estimates and summarize the results.  
5.2 PIR adoption and the timing when joiners enter VC portfolios 
The evidence in Section 5.1 suggests that a state’s adoption of PIR provides a source of plausible 
exogenous variation in the portfolio composition of local VCs. PIR adoption allows local VCs to make some 
investments they otherwise would not have made by increasing their access to funding capital from local state 
pension funds.  
Consistent with states’ PIR adoption affecting the composition of local VCs’ portfolios, I show in Fig. 4 
that joiners are twice as likely to enter VCs’ portfolios for the first time after PIR adoption in VCs’ home 
states. Fig. 4 plots average Post for joiners and VC pairs in the sample against PIR event time dummies that 
indicate for each pair the year relative to PIR adoption in the VC’s home state. In the figure, Panel A (B) dates 
PIR adoption according to UPIA enactment (implementation); see Section 4.1 and Appendix 5. Both panels in 
the Figure show that roughly ten years prior to PIR adoption, a slight negative trend exists in average Post. 
After PIR adoption, however, the trend changes, with average Post beginning to increase one year after PIR 
adoption, and continuing to do so for roughly 12 years. The figure also shows a slight upward trend in average 
Post throughout the entire PIR adoption event time (see discussion in Section 5.4). To construct this plot, I 
organize the (joiner VC) pair panel data in ―PIR event time,‖ where the event is the PIR adoption date in the 
VC’s home state. I then regress Post against PIR event time dummies and cluster standard errors at the level of 
the VC’s home state. I include the VC’s home state fixed effects in the regression. The solid (dotted) line plots 
the estimated coefficients (95
th
 confidence interval) of the PIR event time dummies. The coefficients are 
normalized relative to the year before PIR adoption, which is set to zero. Joiner and VC pairs where the VC is 
located in a state with no PIR adoption in the sample period are excluded from the plots by design. 





















                                      
where      , is an indicator variable that equals one after the state of the VC investor j adopts PIR on a 
two-period panel data set (i.e., a pre- and post-PIR adoption period) of the joiner and VC pairs in the sample 
for which the home state of the VC adopts PIR within the sample period.
25
 I collapse the time series 
information for each joiner and VC pair to control for potential trends in PIR event time and serial correlation 
of standard errors, which are common in difference-in-differences exercises exploiting the staggered adoption 
of regulations across states (see Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan, 2004). Because the timing of PIR adoption 
across states is not the same, but is instead staggered, to collapse the time series information, I use residuals 
from regressing        , on VC home state fixed effects, year dummies, and differential trends across the 
home states of the VCs. For every joiner and VC pair in the data, the residuals from the years before and after 
PIR adoption in the VC’s home state are aggregated, respectively, into the pre- and post-adoption period 
observations. Eq. (3) is estimated by using ordinary least squares (OLS), the aggregate residuals as dependent 
variable, and clustering standard errors at the level of the home state of the VC.  
Column 1 in Panel A of Table 8 shows that the increasing pattern in         after PIR adoption that is 
shown in Fig. 4 is statistically and economically significant. Joiners are 101% more likely (relative to the 
sample mean) to enter the VC’s portfolio after PIR adoption in the VC’s home state (0.618 relative to 0.61; 
see Table 2).  
5.3 PIR adoption in VCs’ home state and portfolio exchanges  
Columns 2-12 in Panel A of Table 8 show that relative portfolio exchanges (between joiners and other 
companies in VCs’ portfolios) also increase (namely, they triple) after PIR adoption in the VCs’ home state. 
The panel presents reduced form estimates of portfolio exchanges on PIR adoption from estimating Eq. (3) 
using the aggregate residuals of the different measures of portfolio exchanges, rather than the aggregate 
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residuals of Post, as dependent variables.
26
 Across the columns, the point estimates are positive and 
statistically significant, except for Relative inventor immigrants in Column 9. Relative to the sample means, 
these estimates imply an average increase of 204% in relative portfolio exchanges. The largest estimated 
increase is of 425% for Relative citations received (coefficient estimate of 0.170, see column 2 in Panel A of 
Table 8) over the sample mean (0.04, see Table 2). The smallest significant increase is 100% for Relative 
inventor emigrates (0.010 relative to 0.01, see Table 2). 
Under the assumption that PIR adoption in the VCs’ home states does not disproportionately increase 
relative portfolio exchanges through channels other than the portfolio joining event, the results in Panel A of 
Table 8 suggest that sharing a common VC causally facilitates portfolio exchanges (see Section 5.4 for a 
relaxation of this identification assumption). Panel B in Table 8 presents the estimates of these causal effects 
using an instrumental variable (IV) estimation: there is an average increase in relative portfolio exchanges of 
329% (relative to the sample means) after joiners enter a VC’s portfolio for the first time, which holds for both 
portfolio exchanges financed by joiners (columns 3, 6, 9) as well as those financed by portfolio companies 
(columns 2, 5, 8). Across all columns in Panel B, the IV estimates are statistically significant for all relative 
portfolio exchanges except for Relative inventor immigrants. To produce these IV estimates, I run a two-stage 
least squares regression of Eq. (2) on the two-period panel of aggregate residuals, where I instrument the 
variable Post with the PIR dummy. The F-test of PIR reported in Panel A (62.76) reveals the instrument’s 
relevance (see Stock and Yogo, 2005).  
In Panel C of Table 8, I present the OLS estimates of Eq. (2) on the two-period panel of aggregate 
residuals as a benchmark against which to compare the IV results of Panel B. Relative to the sample means, 
the OLS benchmark estimates imply an average increase of 315% in relative portfolio exchanges.  
A comparison between the OLS estimates in Panel C of Table 8 and the OLS estimates in Section 4 
(reported in Table 3) reveals that the former are substantially larger. The difference in magnitudes between 
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 I aggregate residuals of the different measures of portfolio exchange for every joiner and VC pair using the same 
methodology to aggregate residuals for         in Section 4.2. Namely, I regress each measure of portfolio exchange on 
the VC’s home state fixed effects, year dummies, and differential trends across the home states of the VCs. Then, for 
every joiner and VC pair in the data, the residuals from the years before and after PIR adoption in the VC’s home state 





















these two groups of OLS estimates is due to differences in sample and methodology between Sections 4 and 5. 
By construction, the estimates in Table 8 exclude all joiner and VC pairs for which the state of the VC does 
not adopt PIR (via UPIA enactment) within the estimation period. In addition, the methodology in Table 3 
allows for both a mean shift and a trend break after the portfolio joining event. Instead, the methodology 
behind the estimates in Table 8 does not allow for a trend break, precisely because the purpose of the 
methodology is to collapse the time series variation into only two time periods per joiner and VC pair. To 
produce estimates of the results in Section 4 that are more comparable to the ones presented in Table 8, I 
calculate the implied average increase in portfolio exchanges from results in Section 4 based on a two-period 
panel data set that also collapses time series variation for every joiner and VC pair into two periods: before 
and after the joining event (see Online Appendix 3). The implied average increase in relative portfolio 
exchanges (relative to the mean) based on these estimates is 123%, much higher than the 60% implied average 
increase of Table 3, and closer to the 315% implied average increase of Table 8. One last discrepancy between 
the methodologies regards the periods over which the time series variation per joiner and VC pairs is 
collapsed. In Table 8, this variation is collapsed into pre- and post-PIR adoption periods, whereas in Online 
Appendix 3, it is collapsed into pre- and post-portfolio-joining-event periods. Since PIR adoption events began 
only in the 1990s, this discrepancy can explain the higher magnitude of the results in Table 8. Portfolio joining 
events started as early as 1977, and, on average, the incidence of portfolio exchanges (and cross-company 
exchanges more generally) is higher after the 1990s than during the 1970s and 1980s. 
In addition, a comparison of estimates across Panels B and C in Table 8 reveals that IV estimates are, on 
average, 4% larger than OLS estimates. This positive difference is not statistically significant, but it makes 
the interpretation of the results difficult (i.e., one cannot determine how much of the OLS estimate is 
selection and how much it is treatment), as is common in the venture capital literature (e.g., Kortum and 
Lerner, 2000; Mollica and Zingales, 2007; Hirukawa and Ueda, 2008; Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf, 2013; 
Popov and Rosenboom, 2011; see Online Appendix 7).  
One potential explanation for the positive difference is that marginal joiners face high costs in attracting 
VCs absent PIR adoption; for example, Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf (2013) show that VCs usually experiment 





















average treatment effect‖ above the average marginal effect in the population and potentially above OLS 
(Angrist and Imbens, 1994). Other potential explanations include measurement error from differences 
between the enactment and actual implementation dates of PIR (cf., Card, 2001). Against this explanation, 
the IV estimate also exceeds the OLS estimate when I proxy PIR adoption using UPIA implementation dates 
(see Online Appendix 8).  
5.4. Robustness checks 
In this section, I discuss several potential methodological concerns with using PIR adoption as an 
exogenous determinant of VCs’ portfolios and present suggestive evidence against them.  
The main methodological concern with the results in Table 8 is that PIR adoption is endogenous to the 
innovation opportunities of joiners and portfolio companies. That is, PIR adoption anticipates (or leads to 
venture capital unrelated) changes in innovation opportunities for joiners and portfolio companies. Three 
additional sets of findings provide evidence against the relative importance of this concern. First, Online 
Appendix 8 shows no significant evidence of correlated trends between relative portfolio exchanges and PIR 
adoption, although weak increases are visible three years before adoption for some of the measures. Second, 
Panel A of Table 9 shows similar results when I restrict the sample to pairs where the joiner and the portfolio 
companies are not in the home state of the VC.
27
 This second set of results point to causal effects as long as 
PIR adoption in the VC’s home state affects relative exchanges between the out-of-state joiners and out-of-
state portfolio companies only through the joining event. In support of this assumption, Online Appendix 8 
shows no significant evidence of correlated trends in PIR adoption and measures of portfolio exchange in this 
subsample. The last set of findings mitigating PIR endogeneity concerns show similar results when I further 
restrict the sample to pairs of joiners and portfolio companies that are also not in coincidental states where PIR 
is adopted at the same time as in the home state of the VC (see Panel B of Table 9). 
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 Only results for inventor-based exchanges do not hold. One interpretation of these results is that the anticipation and 
facilitation by VCs of ―human capital related‖ portfolio exchanges requires closer monitoring, such as the level of 






















A second methodological concern is that the results in Table 8 are driven by aggregate trends that are 
visible in the plots of average Post against PIR event time (Fig. 4; see discussion in Section 5.1). To address 
this concern, I restrict the sample to the joiner and VC pairs for which the entire 11-year portfolio joining 
event time period is within a 20-year interval around the PIR adoption of the VC’s home state. Other joiner 
and VC pairs may have financing events that are too far from the PIR adoption event and are likely to add 
noise rather than help reduce any potential bias in the OLS estimates. The results are summarized in Online 
Appendix 8. They show that aggregate trends do not drive the results in Table 8: the reduced form, IV, and 
OLS estimates are similar for the restricted sample. 
A third concern regards the potential driving effect of California or Massachusetts. Against it, Online 
Appendix 8 shows that results are similar when I drop California and/or Massachusetts from the analysis 
sample, except for all proxies of inventor exchanges. For these measures, none of the estimates (reduced form, 
OLS, or IV) are statistically significant. One potential explanation is the enforcement of noncompete 
agreements imposed in other states during some intervals of the sample period (see Marx, 2013). These 
noncompete agreements restrict the movement of workers across companies and can impede the role of VCs 
in anticipating and facilitating human capital reallocation inside their portfolios.  
A final concern regards potential measurement error in the actual adoption dates of PIR across states, as 
the average lag between PIR adoption via UPIA enactment and via UPIA implementation is 0.37 years (see 
Section 5.1). Against this concern, Online Appendix 8 shows that the results are similar if I date PIR adoption 
using UPIA implementation rather than UPIA enactment (see Online Appendix 5). 
6. Conclusion 
I show that several proxies of exchanges of innovation resources are prevalent between companies sharing 
common venture capital investors. Results hold for companies that secure venture capital for plausibly 
exogenous reasons and in situations where VCs’ bargaining power and potential conflicts of interest are low. 
The data support three novel mechanisms of resource exchange inside portfolios: carve-outs, spawning, and 
recycling, whereby entrepreneurs divest innovation units, start new ventures, and reuse residual assets in other 





















cross-company exchanges, the results suggest that returns to innovation are higher inside VC portfolios—
although not necessarily appropriated by the original inventors (VCs face a complex set of incentives and hold 
strong bargaining power over founders). The results help explain why venture capital disproportionately 
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Fig. 1 Patterns in portfolio exchanges around portfolio joining events 
 
Panel A—Citations received                     Panel B—Citations made                       Panel C—Overall citations 
  
 
Panel D—Patents sold                              Panel E—Patents bought                           Panel F—Patent sales 
   
 
       Panel G—Inventor emigrates                  Panel H—Inventor immigrants                  Panel I—Inventor exchanges  
   
 
                       Panel J—Alliances                  Panel K—Mergers and acquisitions 
  
The figure plots the    coefficients on the dummies for years relative to the venture capital portfolio joining event from estimating 
regression (1) for the different proxies of portfolio exchanges. The event window is five years before and six years after the joiner 
enters the VC’s portfolio for the first time. The dashed lines show the 95% confidence interval on each coefficient; standard errors  are 
clustered at the joiner and VC pair level. Year -1 is the year before the joiner enters the VC’s portfolio for the first time. The 
coefficients are normalized relative to year -1, which is set to zero. All the regressions include joiner and VC pair fixed effects and 





















Fig. 2 Patterns in relative portfolio exchanges around portfolio joining events 
Panel A—Relative citations received          Panel B—Relative citations made       Panel C—Relative overall citations 
 
 
Panel D—Relative patents sold             Panel E—Relative patents bought         Panel F—Relative patent sales 
      
 
Panel G—Relative inventor emigrates         Panel H—Relative inventor immigrants      Panel I—Relative inventor exchanges 
  
 
                   Panel J— Relative alliances              Panel K—Relative mergers and acquisitions 
  
 
The figure plots the    coefficients on the dummies for years relative to the venture capital portfolio joining event from estimating 
regression (1) for the different proxies of relative portfolio exchanges. The event window is five years before and six years after the 
joiner enters the VC’s portfolio for the first time. The dashed lines show the 95% confidence interval on each coefficient; standard 
errors are clustered at the joiner and VC pair level. Year -1 is the year before the joiner enters the VC’s portfolio for the first time. The 
coefficients are normalized relative to year -1, which is set to zero. All the regressions include joiner and VC pair fixed effects and 





















Fig. 3 PIR adoption across US states
 
The figure plots the number of US states adopting PIR across time. The red dotted bars indicate years of PIR enactment, as indicated 
by the corresponding UPIA legislation dates (see Online Appendix 5). The striped black bars indicate the years of the final 






















Fig. 4 Probability of joining the VC’s portfolio around the year of PIR adoption in VC’s home state 
Panel A—Probability of joining the VC’s portfolio around PIR enactment in VC’s home state 
 
Panel B—Probability of joining the VC’s portfolio around PIR implementation in VC’s home state 
 
 
The figure plots the coefficients on the dummies for years relative to the time of PIR adoption in the VC’s home state (PIR event time 
dummies), from regressing Post (i.e., a dummy equal to one after the Joiner first enters the VC’s portfolio) against the PIR event time 
dummies. The event window is 29 years before and 16 years after the adoption of PIR in the home state of the VC. The solid (dotted) 
line plots the estimated coefficients (95th confidence interval) of the PIR event time dummies. The coefficients are normalized relative 
to the year before PIR adoption, which is set to zero. All the regressions include VC’s home state fixed effects. An observation is a 
joiner and VC pair cross year. Panel A uses information on PIR adoption via enactment (i.e., when the law was approved by the local 
government), and Panel B on PIR adoption via implementation (i.e., when the law became effective); see Online Appendix 5 and Fig. 





















Table 1  
Sample composition 
Panel A. Distribution over time of venture capital portfolio joining events and patent awards 
 Venture capital portfolio joining events Patent awards 
  Total Seed  Early stage Expansion Later stage Patent filings Patent grants 
1976      10 7 
1977 6 5 1 0 0 26 10 
1978 12 10 0 2 0 28 19 
1979 23 9 7 7 0 44 27 
1980 86 55 15 15 1 51 40 
1981 219 121 49 42 7 124 33 
1982 260 103 66 69 22 166 89 
1983 348 156 77 87 28 197 154 
1984 336 159 79 81 17 268 184 
1985 341 134 62 115 30 340 239 
1986 290 132 58 66 34 442 380 
1987 275 134 67 57 17 558 427 
1988 270 114 77 66 13 718 660 
1989 343 115 94 102 32 834 679 
1990 221 78 43 83 17 1,026 802 
1991 165 39 49 61 16 1,170 1,002 
1992 184 54 39 72 19 1,407 1,161 
1993 200 78 58 46 18 1,730 1,356 
1994 216 77 60 44 35 2,357 1,560 
1995 278 97 97 64 20 3,816 2,006 
1996 244 71 61 91 21 4,066 2,493 
1997 343 75 123 99 46 5,066 3,985 
1998 571 140 205 169 57 5,252 4,309 
1999 810 122 269 321 98 5,867 4,710 
2000 1,171 71 480 473 147 6,918 5,088 
2001 856 73 330 362 91 7,640 5,385 
2002 721 46 247 304 124 7,558 6,013 
2003 807 52 260 299 196 5,889 5,888 
2004 743 43 192 278 230 5,118 5,464 
2005 559 23 144 203 189 3,708 7,159 
2006 395 22 102 146 125 1,836 6,769 
2007 335 24 63 124 124 516 6,673 
2008 187 12 39 71 65 25 7 
Total 11,815 2,390 1,278 288 1,747 74,771 74,771 
 
Panel B. Distribution of patents and joiners across states (Top 10 states) 
  
Patents % Patents Joiners % Joiners 
Venture  
capital firms 
% Venture  
capital firms 
CA 39,393 56.04 1,845 46.59 415 32.81 
MA 6,913 9.83 517 13.06 139 10.99 
TX 5,056 7.19 191 4.82 60 4.74 
CO 2,589 3.68 110 2.78 32 2.53 
WA 2,098 2.98 121 3.06 33 2.61 
PA 1,115 1.59 111 2.8 35 2.77 
NJ 1,022 1.45 106 2.68 24 1.9 
NY 993 1.41 100 2.53 130 10.28 
IL 966 1.37 71 1.79 46 3.64 
MN 864 1.23 63 1.59 28 2.21 
 
 
Panel C. Distribution of patents across 2-digit technology classes (Top 10 classes) 





















22 Computer Hardware and Software 13,000 17.39 
21 Communications 8,142 10.89 
46 Semiconductor Devices  7,159 9.57 
32 Surgery & Medical Instruments 6,589 8.81 
24 Information Storage 5,818 7.78 
31 Drugs 4,736 6.33 
33 Biotechnology 3,753 5.02 
41 Electrical Devices 3,302 4.42 
19 Miscellaneous Chemical 2,724 3.64 
45 Power Systems 2,266 3.03 
 
Panel D.  Industry distribution of joiners 
Industries Number of joiners % of joiners 
Medical health 699 17.65 
Semiconductors  659 16.64 
Computer software 649 16.39 
Communications and media 446 11.26 
Biotechnology 432 10.91 
Internet specific 363 9.17 
Computer hardware 342 8.64 
Industrial energy 250 6.31 
Other products 67 1.69 
Consumer related 53 1.34 
Total 3,960 100 
 
The final sample includes information for 3,960 joiners that filed 74,771 patents (approximately 2.5% of all patent awards) and first 
entered the portfolio of one of 1,265 VCs during 1976-2008. The data include 11,815 portfolio joining events. All additional financing 
rounds by an existing VC investor are not counted as portfolio joining events. In Panel B, the joiner’s home state is retrieved from the 
SDC data set. For some joiners, this information is missing. I used web searches based on the joiner’s name to fill in the missing 
information. For 649 joiners, the web search returned no information, most likely because they are no longer active. In very few cases, 
the joiner’s home state differs from the location of the inventor reported in the patent filings (<5%). In Panel C, I reclassified the three-
digit technology classes of patents into two-digit classes using the method by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001). In Panel D, I retrieve 





















Table 2  
Summary statistics 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Citations received                  121,553  0.05 1.50 0.00 263.00 
Citations made                 121,553  0.10 2.35 0.00 249.00 
Overall citations                 121,553  0.15 2.81 0.00 263.00 
Patents sold         121,553  0.01 0.23 0.00 41.00 
Patents bought         121,553  0.01 0.24 0.00 22.00 
Patent sales         121,553  0.02 0.39 0.00 41.00 
Inventor emigrates          121,553  0.01 0.12 0.00 8.00 
Inventor immigrants           121,553  0.01 0.17 0.00 12.00 
Inventor exchanges          121,553  0.02 0.21 0.00 12.00 
Alliances   121,553  0.001 0.034 0.00 1.00 
Mergers and acquisitions   121,553  0.002 0.043 0.00 1.00 
Matched citations received                  121,553  0.01 0.56 0.00 120.00 
Matched citations made                 121,553  0.03 0.74 0.00 119.00 
Matched overall citations                 121,553  0.04 0.97 0.00 132.00 
Matched patents sold         121,553  0.00 0.02 0.00 4.00 
Matched patents bought         121,553  0.00 0.08 0.00 20.00 
Matched patent sales         121,553  0.00 0.08 0.00 20.00 
Matched inventor emigrates          121,553  0.00 0.11 0.00 30.00 
Matched inventor immigrants           121,553  0.00 0.11 0.00 30.00 
Matched inventor exchanges          121,553  0.00 0.11 0.00 30.00 
Matched alliances                 121,553  0.000 0.008 0.00 1.00 
Matched mergers and acquisitions                 121,553  0.000 0.000 0.00 0.00 
Relative citations received                  121,553  0.04 1.59 -120.00 263.00 
Relative citations made                 121,553  0.07 2.39 -104.00 249.00 
Relative overall citations                 121,553  0.11 2.91 -131.00 262.00 
Relative patents sold         121,553  0.01 0.23 -4.00 41.00 
Relative patents bought         121,553  0.01 0.25 -20.00 22.00 
Relative patent sales         121,553  0.02 0.40 -20.00 41.00 
Relative inventor emigrates 121,553 0.01 0.16 -30.00 8.00 
Relative inventor immigrants  121,553 0.01 0.20 -30.00 12.00 
Relative inventor exchanges 121,553 0.01 0.23 -30.00 12.00 
Relative alliances                 121,553  0.001 0.035 -1.00 1.00 
Relative mergers and acquisitions                121,553  0.002 0.043 0.00 1.00 
Post                 121,553  0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Year                 121,553  1997 7.85 1976 2008 
Year financing                 121,553  1996 7.54 1977 2008 
Young company          120,610  0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Early stage          121,553  0.43 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Junior VC          111,383  0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Specialist VC          116,452  0.10 0.29 0.00 1.00 
 
This table presents the summary statistics of the main variables used in the empirical analysis. Observations are at the joiner and VC 





















Table 3  
Portfolio exchanges between joiners and portfolio companies 
Panel A—Portfolio exchanges 
 
Panel B—Relative portfolio exchanges 
 
This table reports the coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from estimating Eq. (2) on the different proxies of portfolio exchanges. An observation is a joiner and VC pair cross time (year). The 
explanatory variables of interest are Post, an indicator variable that equals one after the joiner enters the VC portfolio for the first time, and Post×Event-Trend, which equals zero before the joiner enters 
the VC portfolio for the first time and indicates the first through sixth years after the joiner enters the portfolio. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the joiner and VC pair level.*, 
**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 



















Post 0.021*** 0.100*** 0.121*** 0.005*** 0.009*** 0.014*** 0.003** 0.007*** 0.011*** 0.000 0.000 
 (0.006) (0.022) (0.023) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
Post× Event-Trend 0.033*** -0.026** 0.007 0.002*** 0.001 0.003*** -0.001 -0.006*** -0.005*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.005) (0.011) (0.012) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Obs. 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 
R-2 0.211 0.312 0.293 0.183 0.196 0.222 0.587 0.633 0.605 0.476 0.422 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 






























Post 0.018*** 0.060*** 0.078*** 0.004*** 0.009*** 0.014*** 0.005*** 0.008*** 0.012*** 0.000 0.000 
 (0.007) (0.022) (0.023) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
Post×Event-Trend 0.024*** -0.025** -0.001 0.002*** 0.001 0.004*** -0.001* -0.006*** -0.005*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.005) (0.011) (0.012) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Obs. 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 





















Table 4  
Heterogeneity I: Relative portfolio exchanges between joiners and portfolio companies 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 































Panel A—Age joiner 
Young            
Post 0.019** 0.116*** 0.135*** 0.002 0.008** 0.010** 0.005** 0.013*** 0.017*** 0.000 -0.001*** 
 (0.008) (0.035) (0.037) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) 
Post× Event-Trend 0.028*** -0.033* -0.005 0.002*** 0.001 0.003** -0.000 -0.008*** -0.006*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 
 (0.006) (0.018) (0.019) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Obs. 71,181 71,181 71,181 71,181 71,181 71,181 71,181 71,181 71,181 71,181 71,181 
R-2 0.206 0.293 0.282 0.180 0.164 0.192 0.181 0.164 0.187 0.465 0.349 
Old            
Post 0.016 -0.025 -0.009 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.021*** 0.005** 0.002 0.006 -0.000 0.001** 
 (0.012) (0.018) (0.021) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.000) (0.001) 
Post× Event-Trend 0.020** -0.013 0.007 0.004** 0.003 0.007** -0.002** -0.003** -0.003** 0.001*** 0.001** 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.016) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Obs. 49,429 49,429 49,429 49,429 49,429 49,429 49,429 49,429 49,429 49,429 49,429 
R-2 0.185 0.280 0.228 0.182 0.207 0.233 0.135 0.161 0.165 0.481 0.478 
p-value F-tests            
Post 0.84 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.44 0.12 0.79 0.02 0.04 0.67 0.00 
Post× Event-Trend 0.45 0.33 0.62 0.32 0.25 0.23 0.12 0.01 0.08 0.95 0.12 
Panel B—Stage joiner 
Early            
Post 0.003 0.061** 0.063** 0.005* 0.009** 0.014*** 0.006*** 0.017*** 0.021*** -0.000 -0.001** 
 (0.005) (0.028) (0.029) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) 
Post× Event-Trend 0.018*** -0.001 0.017* 0.002 0.001 0.003 -0.000 -0.008*** -0.006*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.010) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Obs. 51,803 51,803 51,803 51,803 51,803 51,803 51,803 51,803 51,803 51,803 51,803 
R-2 0.181 0.286 0.274 0.241 0.209 0.251 0.167 0.158 0.179 0.361 0.329 
Late             
Post 0.027*** 0.060* 0.088** 0.004* 0.009*** 0.013*** 0.004* 0.002 0.005 0.000 0.001 
 (0.011) (0.033) (0.035) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 





















 (0.008) (0.018) (0.020) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Obs. 69,750 69,750 69,750 69,750 69,750 69,750 69,750 69,750 69,750 69,750 69,750 
R-2 0.198 0.293 0.266 0.150 0.170 0.187 0.149 0.167 0.177 0.524 0.471 
p-value F-tests            
Post 0.03 0.99 0.59 0.70 0.96 0.88 0.56 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.01 
Post× Event-Trend 0.36 0.04 0.16 0.36 0.89 0.66 0.09 0.05 0.22 0.40 0.01 
Panel C—Joiner is new to venture capital 
New to Venture Capital           
Post 0.020** 0.086** 0.106*** 0.004 0.008** 0.012*** 0.005** 0.012*** 0.015*** 0.000 -0.001** 
 (0.009) (0.034) (0.036) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) 
Post× Event-Trend 0.025*** -0.022* 0.003 0.003*** 0.002 0.005*** 0.000 -0.006*** -0.005*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.006) (0.012) (0.013) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Obs. 71,077 71,077 71,077 71,077 71,077 71,077 71,077 71,077 71,077 71,077 71,077 
R-2 0.211 0.278 0.270 0.183 0.189 0.223 0.168 0.168 0.184 0.428 0.367 
Already Secured Venture Capital          
Post 0.018 0.024 0.042 0.005*** 0.011*** 0.016*** 0.005* 0.004 0.008** -0.000 0.001 
 (0.012) (0.025) (0.027) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.000) (0.001) 
Post× Event-Trend 0.024** -0.030 -0.007 0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.003** -0.006*** -0.005*** 0.001*** 0.001** 
 (0.010) (0.021) (0.023) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Obs. 50,476 50,476 50,476 50,476 50,476 50,476 50,476 50,476 50,476 50,476 50,476 
R-2 0.181 0.317 0.263 0.182 0.185 0.201 0.146 0.160 0.170 0.509 0.466 
p-value F-tests            
Post 0.88 0.14 0.15 0.60 0.58 0.50 0.98 0.08 0.15 0.74 0.03 
Post× Event-Trend 0.92 0.73 0.72 0.15 0.51 0.21 0.03 0.71 0.96 0.91 0.09 
Panel D—VC experience 
Junior            
Post 0.011 -0.001 0.010 0.006*** 0.010*** 0.016*** 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
Post× Event-Trend 0.013*** -0.000 0.013** 0.003* 0.003* 0.005** 0.000 -0.002* -0.000 0.001*** 0.001* 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Obs. 57,344 57,344 57,344 57,344 57,344 57,344 57,344 57,344 57,344 57,344 57,344 
R-2 0.224 0.277 0.254 0.234 0.288 0.294 0.143 0.142 0.167 0.476 0.387 
Senior            
Post 0.028** 0.140*** 0.168*** 0.003 0.010** 0.013** 0.009*** 0.019*** 0.025*** -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.014) (0.051) (0.053) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.000) (0.001) 
Post× Event-Trend 0.033*** -0.059*** -0.026 0.003** 0.000 0.003 -0.002** -0.011*** -0.011*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 
 (0.009) (0.022) (0.024) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Obs. 54,028 54,028 54,028 54,028 54,028 54,028 54,028 54,028 54,028 54,028 54,028 





















This table reports the coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from estimating Eq. (2) on the different proxies of relative portfolio exchanges. An observation is a joiner and VC pair cross time 
(year). The explanatory variables of interest are Post, an indicator variable that equals one after the joiner enters the VC portfolio for the first time, and Post×Event-Trend, which equals zero before the 
joiner enters the VC portfolio for the first time, and indicates the first through sixth years after the joiner enters the portfolio. In Panel A, the age of the joiner is estimated as the difference between the 
year the company joins the portfolio of the VC and the founding year, as reported in SDC. Young (Old) are joiners below (above) the median joiner age in the sample of two years. In Panel B, joiners are 
defined as early if the first investment they secured from a VC was either at a seed or early stage round according to the SDC files, following Lindsey (2008). In Panel C, I define a joiner as new to 
venture capital if the joiner is securing venture capital for the first time. In Panel D, investor experience is measured by the number of prior investments made by the VC following Lindsey (2008). Junior 
(Senior) are VCs that are below (above) the median VC experience in the sample of six years. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the joiner and VC pair level.*, **, and *** 







p-value F-tests            
Post 0.26 0.01 0.00 0.37 0.93 0.63 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.51 0.94 






















Heterogeneity II: relative portfolio exchanges between joiners and portfolio companies 
 
This table reports the coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from estimating Eq. (2) on the different proxies of relative portfolio exchanges. An observation is a joiner and VC pair cross time 
(year). The explanatory variables of interest are Post, an indicator variable that equals one after the joiner enters the VC portfolio for the first time, and Post×Event-Trend, which equals zero before the 
joiner enters the VC portfolio for the first time, and indicates the first through sixth years after the joiner enters the portfolio.  In Panel A, I consider the six broad industry sectors defined by SDC: 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 






























Panel A—Industry of joiner and portfolio companies 
Same industry            
Post 0.014* 0.112*** 0.126*** 0.005** 0.007** 0.012*** 0.004** 0.006** 0.009*** 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.008) (0.040) (0.041) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
Post× Event-Trend 0.015** -0.006 0.010 0.002** 0.002 0.004* -0.000 -0.004*** -0.003*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Obs. 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 
R-2 0.193 0.245 0.233 0.230 0.192 0.235 0.142 0.152 0.166 0.444 0.445 
Different industry            
Post -0.000 -0.091*** -0.092*** -0.001 0.002*** 0.001 0.002 0.004** 0.005** -0.000 0.000 
 (0.003) (0.025) (0.025) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Post× Event-Trend -0.001 -0.017** -0.018** 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.001* -0.002*** -0.003*** 0.000** 0.001*** 
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Obs. 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 
R-2 0.132 0.177 0.173 0.097 0.120 0.113 0.155 0.165 0.172 0.488 0.387 
Panel B—VC fund of joiner and portfolio companies 
Same fund            
Post 0.008 0.007 0.015 0.005** 0.009*** 0.014*** 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.000 
 (0.007) (0.025) (0.026) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
Post× Event-Trend 0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.002* 0.002 0.004* -0.001* -0.001 -0.002* 0.000*** 0.000* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Obs. 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 
R-2 0.187 0.222 0.206 0.185 0.202 0.220 0.130 0.137 0.137 0.418 0.457 
Different fund            
Post 0.007 0.013 0.020 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.004** 0.009*** 0.011*** -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.005) (0.027) (0.028) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) 
Post× Event-Trend 0.013** -0.022** -0.010 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.005*** -0.004*** 0.001 0.001*** 
 (0.005) (0.011) (0.012) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Obs. 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 





















biotechnology, communications and media, computer-related, medical, non high technology, and semiconductors (see Table 1). Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the joiner and 






















Inventor and executive exchanges into (and from) incumbent and future portfolio companies 
Panel A—Inventor exchanges  
 












































Post 0.005*** 0.008*** 0.012*** 0.001 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.003*** 0.001 0.004*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Post× Event-Trend -0.001* -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.001*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 0.000 -0.001** 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Obs. 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 
R-2 0.517 0.591 0.571 0.147 0.172 0.173 0.159 0.159 0.171 
Mean dep. var. 0.005 0.009 0.014 0.002 0.008 0.009 0.004 0.002 0.005 


























Post 0.008*** 0.014*** 0.020*** 0.000 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.008*** 0.001 0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Post× Event-Trend -0.002*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.002*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.000* -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Obs. 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 
R-2 0.160 0.112 0.147 0.115 0.112 0.117 0.149 0.102 0.146 




































This table reports the coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from estimating Eq. (2) on the different proxies of portfolio exchanges. An observation is a joiner and VC pair cross time (year). The 
explanatory variables of interest are Post, an indicator variable that equals one after the joiner enters the VC portfolio for the first time, and Post×Event-Trend, which equals zero before the joiner enters 
the VC portfolio for the first time, and indicates the first through sixth years after the joiner enters the portfolio. The dependent variable is specified at the top of each column. The sample used in the first 
three columns of Panel C restricts observations to those where no executives leave the joiner to work in another portfolio company. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the joiner 
and VC pair level.*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   





immigrants   
Inventor 
exchanges   
Conditional 
inventor 
emigrates   
Conditional 
inventor 




Post 0.003** 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Post× Event-Trend -0.001 -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Obs. 120,955 120,955 120,955 121,553 121,553 121,553 
R-2 0.161 0.177 0.189 0.127 0.099 0.124 
Sample Executives do 
not leave   
Executives do 
not leave   
Executives do 
not leave   All All All 






















Grouped and individual inventor exchanges 














Panel A reports the coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from estimating Eq. (2) on the different proxies of portfolio exchanges. An observation is a joiner and VC pair cross time (year). The 
explanatory variables of interest are Post, an indicator variable that equals one after the joiner enters the VC portfolio for the first time, and Post×Event-Trend, which equals zero before the joiner enters 
the VC portfolio for the first time, and indicates the first through sixth years after the joiner enters the portfolio. The dependent variable is specified at the top of each column. Standard errors are 
heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the joiner and VC pair level.*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Panel B classifies the circumstances 
surrounding emigration of teams of inventors from joiners to portfolio companies. There are a total of 73 Joiners for which at least one team of inventors emigrates to another portfolio company. There 
are a total of 95 emigration events of teams of inventors. I classify the circumstances surrounding such migrations into seven categories of corporate events (merger or acquisition by a company outside 
the VC portfolio, merger or acquisition by an incumbent portfolio company, merger or acquisition by a future portfolio company, IPO, liquidation, restructuring and founding) by comparing the timing of 
the emigration and the timing of such corporate events. An emigration event is classified as a respective corporate event if it occurs within four years of the corporate event. The class ―reorganization‖ 
includes several types of corporate events including: hiring of new CEOs, securing investment from government, and opening a foreign subsidiary. An emigration event is unclassifiable if it does not 
take place within four years of the six corporate events considered.
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable 
At least one 
inventor 
emigrates 















Post 0.001* 0.003*** 0.001 0.002* 0.001** 0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Post× Event-Trend -0.000 -0.003*** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000 -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Obs. 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 121,553 
R-2 0.155 0.163 0.126 0.121 0.147 0.170 
Merger and acquisition outside the portfolio 21 22% 
Merger and acquisition incumbent portfolio company 7 7% 
Merger and acquisition future portfolio company 3 3% 
Liquidation 3 3% 
Foundation 34 36% 
IPO 2 2% 
Reorganization 7 7% 






















PIR Adoption and relative portfolio exchanges between joiners and portfolio companies 
 
Panel A in this table reports the coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from estimating Eq. (3). An observation is a joiner and VC pair cross time, where time has been collapsed into two periods: 
pre- and post-PIR adoption in the VC’s home state. The dependent variables correspond to the aggregate residuals from regressions of the outcome variables on year fixed effects, differential trends across 
the home states of VCs, and fixed effects at the level of the home state of the VC, which are then collapsed to two observations per joiner and VC pair: before and after the home state of the VC adopts 
PIR. PIR is an indicator that equals one after the home state of the VC adopts PIR via UPIA enactment (see Online Appendix 3). Panel B of this table reports IV estimates of Eq. (2) in the two-period 
panel (i.e., pre and post for every pair), where I instrument Post using PIR. Panel C of this table reports OLS estimates of Eq. (2) on the two-period panel. The event window includes all observations from 
joiner and VC pairs for which the VC’s home state adopted PIR within the sample period and corresponds to 29 years before and 16 years after the adoption of PIR in the home state of the VC. Standard 
errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the home state of the VC level throughout.*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  





































  Panel A —Reduced Form 
PIR 0.618*** 0.170*** 0.120*** 0.290*** 0.012*** 0.015*** 0.027*** 0.010** 0.004 0.014** 0.004*** 0.006*** 
 (0.078) (0.052) (0.040) (0.090) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations 7,694 7,694 7,694 7,694 7,694 7,694 7,694 7,694 7,694 7,694 7,694 7,694 
R-squared 0.888 0.516 0.724 0.632 0.639 0.547 0.599 0.589 0.619 0.605 0.736 0.690 
F- exc. instruments 62.76            
  Panel B — IV 
Post  0.276*** 0.193*** 0.469*** 0.019*** 0.024*** 0.043*** 0.015*** 0.006 0.022*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 
  (0.054) (0.044) (0.094) (0.003) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.001) (0.002) 
Observations  7,694 7,694 7,694 7,694 7,694 7,694 7,694 7,694 7,694 7,694 7,694 
R-squared  0.516 0.724 0.633 0.639 0.547 0.599 0.590 0.619 0.606 0.736 0.689 
   
  Panel C —OLS 
Post  0.273*** 0.196*** 0.469*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.037*** 0.016*** 0.007* 0.024*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
  (0.062) (0.054) (0.114) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations  7,694 7,694 7,694 7,694 7,694 7,694 7,694 7,694 7,694 7,694 7,694 






















Robustness checks: PIR adoption and relative portfolio exchanges between joiners and portfolio companies  




































































Panel A—Joiners and portfolio companies out of the home state of the VC 










































ions 3,870 3,870 3,870 3,870 3,870 3,870 3,870 3,870 3,870 3,870 3,870 3,870 
R-
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Post 


































ions  3,870 3,870 3,870 3,870 3,870 3,870 3,870 3,870 3,870 3,870 3,870 
R-
squared  0.520 0.663 0.610 0.720 0.555 0.622 0.631 0.527 0.641 0.652 0.790 








































ions  3,870 3,870 3,870 3,870 3,870 3,870 3,870 3,870 3,870 3,870 3,870 
R-
squared  0.520 0.663 0.610 0.720 0.555 0.622 0.631 0.527 0.641 0.652 0.790 
Panel B— Joiners and portfolio companies out of the home state of the VC and out of coincidental states 








































ions 3,618 3,618 3,618 3,618 3,618 3,618 3,618 3,618 3,618 3,618 3,618 3,618 
R-






         
  






































ions  3,618 3,618 3,618 3,618 3,618 3,618 3,618 3,618 3,618 3,618 3,618 
R-
squared  0.681 0.524 0.624 0.565 0.722 0.632 0.635 0.528 0.645 0.654 0.800 
  IV 






















The first block of each panel in this table reports the coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from estimating Eq. 
(3). An observation is a joiner and VC pair cross time, where time has been collapsed into two periods: pre- and post-PIR 
adoption in the VC’s home state. The dependent variables correspond to the aggregate residuals from regressions of the 
outcome variables on year fixed effects, differential trends across the home states of VCs, and fixed effects at the level of 
the home state of the VC, which are then collapsed to two observations per joiner and VC pair: before and after the home 
state of the VC adopts PIR. PIR is an indicator that equals one after the home state of the VC adopts PIR via UPIA 
enactment. The second block of each panel in this table reports OLS estimates of Eq. (2) on the two-period panel (i.e., pre 
and post for every pair). The third block of each panel in this table reports IV estimates of Eq. (2) in the two-period panel, 
where I instrument Post using PIR. The event window includes all observations from joiner and VC pairs for which the 
VC’s home state adopted PIR within the sample period, and corresponds to 29 years before and 16 years after the adoption 
of PIR in the home state of the VC. Panel A restricts the sample to joiners and portfolio companies that are located out of 
the home state of the VC. Panel B restricts the data to joiners and portfolio companies that are located out of the home state 
of the VC and are also not located in states that coincidentally passed PIR at the same time as the home state of the VC 
(coincidental states). Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the home state of the VC level 
throughout.*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
 
 






















ions  3,618 3,618 3,618 3,618 3,618 3,618 3,618 3,618 3,618 3,618 3,618 
R-
squared  0.681 0.524 0.624 0.565 0.722 0.632 0.634 0.528 0.645 0.654 0.800 
